Abstract. A few decades of work in the AI field have focused efforts on developing a new generation of systems which can acquire knowledge via interaction with the world. Yet, until very recently, most such attempts were underpinned by research which predominantly regarded linguistic phenomena as separated from the brain and body. This could lead one into believing that to emulate linguistic behaviour, it suffices to develop 'software' operating on abstract representations that will work on any computational machine. This picture is inaccurate for several reasons, which are elucidated in this paper and extend beyond sensorimotor and semantic resonance. Beginning with a review of research, I list several heterogeneous arguments against disembodied language, in an attempt to draw conclusions for developing embodied multisensory agents which communicate verbally and non-verbally with their environment.
INTRODUCTION

… His eyes only see His ears only hear … -
No End of Fun (1967) In the 'traditional' view, going back to René Descartes, cognition has been seen as manipulation of symbolic, mental representations, with the brain conceived of as an input-output processor, a problem-solving device running abstract, generalised computational programs which enable us to process incoming data into a perception/interpretation of the outside world. This 'software', separate from the body, was equated with the mind, while the body was regarded as an output system attached to the cognitive processing system, with similar tasks achieved by applying the same underlying motor program to different effectors: 1 Inst. of Applied Linguistics, Univ. of Warsaw, ul. Browarna 8/10, PL-00-311 Warsaw, Poland. E-mail: michal.paradowski@uw.edu.pl.
magnam esse differentiam inter ment
corpus ex naturâ suâ sit semper divisibile, mens autem plane indivisibilis … mentem a corpore omnino esse diversam.
-Descartes (1641) Meditationes de prima philosophia VI;19
The information-processing approach or computer metaphor has become further entrenched over the latter half of the previous century due to the adoption of the digital computer as the platform to run the symbolic computations (Hoffmann et al., n.d.) . However, this dualist perspective has been increasingly challenged, beginning with Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, John Dewey, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and it is today widely acknowledged that perception and cognition are grounded in bodily experience. The brain is not the sole problem-solving resource we have at our disposal; the organiser/filtering machine is the body-en-total. Heuristics depend on our physiology; cognition is not only influenced and biased by states of the body, but crucial to it are also the rest of the body beyond the brain, as well as the environment.
Until very recently, most language research has, in a Cartesian manner, traditionally regarded linguistic phenomena as internal, mental, isolationist and amodal (that is, separate and independent from perception, action and emotion systems, and the body); a view endorsed in psychology (e.g. Geschwind 1970; Kintsch 1998), philosophy (e.g. Katz & Fodor 1963; Fodor 1983) , and linguistics (e.g. early Chomsky -1957 Chomsky - , 1975 Nowak et al. 2002; Jackendoff 2002) 3 . For instance, Chomsky's most seminal theories were based on mathematical formalism and saw language as governed by a context-free grammar extended with transformational rules operating on (non-semantic) symbol strings and complemented by morphophonemic rules, with autonomous syntax at the core of the theory of language. The reason why his views for a long time did not go beyond such a perspective should not come as a surprise. His Syntactic Structures, which became a revolutionary and foundational work 4 in linguistics, grew out of a series of lecture notes for an audience of undergrad (mainly electrical engineering and maths) students at the MIT. 5 Also, Chomsky's ideas were born at the 2 "There is a great difference between mind and body, inasmuch as body is by nature always divisible, and the mind is entirely indivisible.
[…] the mind or soul of man is entirely different from the body." 3 A votum separatum in this domain is the field of biolinguistics, which hypothesizes a strong genetic (or neurobiological) endowment for language (UG) and determination of its structure (e.g. postulating selectional-i.e. evolutionary fitness-advantages), treating the language faculty on a par with other biological systems (see e.g. same time as the establishment of computer science as a distinct academic discipline, the beginnings of computational linguistics, and the founding of AI research, which all shared the dominant idea that thought can be described with formal logic.
The generative school inspired several decades of linguistic thought, and even theories trying to modify or undermine its tenets were still relying on the underlying view of language as a system manipulating abstract symbols. This dualistic view could lead one into believing that in order to credibly emulate linguistic behaviour, it suffices to develop 'software' operating on (i.e. applying combinatorial rules such as Merge and Move to) abstract representations 6 that will work on any computational machine, and that its operations will be implementationindependent, functioning identically regardless of the physical hardware.
EMBODIED LANGUAGE IN HUMANS
to turn print into exciting situations in their skulls -Kurt Vonnegut Slaughterhouse- Five (1969:205) The dualistic approach just outlined above works to some extent in statistical machine translation, automatic text indexing and retrieval (think e.g. search engines), natural-language interfaces or dialogue systems, but if the system to be developed is to truly mimic human behaviour, the disembodied picture is not very accurate for several reasons. One may be doubtful about modularity and the existence of a specifically dedicated innate language acquisition device, but must still take into account the following phenomena and theoretical developments: ),were initially taken as evidence for a 'language gene', it was later discovered that the protein impacts a wide range of phenotypic features all over the body (including facial motor control) and that the impairments of the family affected with the mutation went beyond language to other cognitive capacities. It is now more believed that it is networks of gene interactions rather than individual genes that have an influence on language (Knopka et al. 2009 ), but the neurobiological influence is there; 4. many Universal Grammar-based constraints now being reinterpreted as learning and processing constraints. That is, the difficulty in the acquisition of certain aspects of language are being accounted for by their complexity, the computational load under which the user/learner operates, his/her memory and attention limitations, or ease of access to 8 Although one must be cautious about the conclusions since the cortical development in the subjects of the study was not normal in the first place (Chomsky 1980:264 10 The Critical Period Hypothesis (or its idea), proposed by Penfield and Roberts (1959) , posits the existence of an ideal window of time during which genetically endowed language acquisition can-given adequate stimuli-take place spontaneously, relatively effortlessly, and characteristically meeting a high degree of success, after which acquiring a language naturally, automatically and with complete ultimate attainment becomes impossible. "The earlier the better" rule of thumb captures the negative correlation between the age of acquisition onset and subsequent asymptotic attainment. Most evidence to support the claim was supplied by Eric Lenneberg (1967) in his Biological Foundations of Language. While the existence of a critical period is widely accepted where first language acquisition is concerned, attempts to extend it to second language acquisition still arouse a good deal of contention (for instance, Lamendella (1977) suggested the term 'sensitive period' to emphasise the fact that acquisition may be more efficient during childhood, but not restricted to that period). 11 The distinction can be considered on the example of any organic system: "Studies of the digestive system, for example, distinguish between its structural properties and what it is doing after you ate a sandwich" (Noam Chomsky, p.c., 8 Nov 2011), and can actually be 12 This seems to be a reflection of a more general phenomenon where "there is no animal in which there is known to be a complete segregation of sensory processing" (Stein et al. 1996:497 16 , linguistic tasks expedited when accompanied by action (Rieser et al. 1994) , and sensorimotor experiences intertwined with cognition in episodic memory (Pfeifer 2011 18 onwards) , ii)available in more 'primitive' organisms without vision or hearing, iii)perceptible during half-sleep, and iv)impacting our bodily functioning more strongly (the somatic reaction to extremely high or low temperatures, pressure or skin irritation is more likely to be stronger than e.g. to an unpleasant sight or sound). This might account for the lack of activation in visual cortical areas. 15 16 This conviction can also be found in 'folk wisdom'. For instance, in one episode of a Malaysian edutainment program for children which I was consulting on for a European broadcaster, a monkey was hanging upside down because that was the position in which she last saw her orange juice. 17 I.e. texts describing an event in which the main character was spatially dissociated from a target object, e.g.:
John was preparing for a marathon in August. After doing a few warm-up exercises, he took off his sweatshirt and went jogging. (emph.added) embodiment-the interaction of the language faculty with the sensory apparatus and motor system-it is unrealistic to replicate accurately the processes which take place during language acquisition, comprehension, or production, or during nonlinguistic actions. Cognitive mechanisms are synergistically intertwined with affective and somatic components, and largely inseparable (Ziemke 2011). (Wang 2009:2f.) . Under such a functionalist approach, the body is merely a platform on which cognitive operations are running. In some areas, such closed systems were able to achieve spectacular feats, for instance in defeating world chess champions.
THE COROLLARIES FOR ROBOTICS
Chess, however, is a formal game, set in a virtual world with discrete states, positions, and licit moves, a game involving complete information, and a static one: no move means no change, and the inventory of legitimate operations remains constant (Pfeifer & Scheier 1999:58ff.) . This is quite unlike what usually happens in the real world. Hence, the last two and a half decades have witnessed recurrent appeals for situated, embodied autonomous systems actively and directly interacting with the world around (cf. op. cit.; Brooks 1991; Varela et al. 1991 ) and constructing knowledge via this dynamic enactment (the active learning being qualitatively different from statistical machine learning; cf. e.g Froese 2009; Vernon 2010). Evidently robots, even anthropomorphic ones, are far from isomorphic with humans in terms of both the 'brain' and the rest of the body, including the input and output devices (sensors and actuators). Also, as one reviewer rightly remarks, in the language technology field priority is not necessarily to make a machine as humanlike as possible, with the same architecture; rather, it is to make the machine so that it does things on a level comparable to humans (or, I would add, surpassing that) -in other words, to achieve similar-or better-functionality in terms of mode, scope, or scale. Or, going completely beyond the anthropocentric GOFAI perspective (Haugeland 1985 ; cf. Wang 2008), since passing the Turing Test is not a sine qua non of being intelligent, 18 The fact that the appropriate relations to some outside world could be established by the system's designer or end-user becomes unhelpful the moment we want to deal with an autonomous agent, with the human interpreter removed from the loop, as emphasised by Steven Harnad in his seminal (1990) paper (cf. also Pfeifer & Scheier 1999:69f.) .
as acknowledged by the test's designer himself (Turing 1950 ). This, however, means that robust artificial cognitive agents can bypass the human limitations 19 inherent in most of the above points (just as they could overcome some contingencies resulting from the material properties of the human brain and bodily features such as synaptic speed and efficiency, the physical characteristics of the vocal tract, the auditory perception system, or muscular flexibility 20 ). Nevertheless, they could still benefit from strengthened associative connections owing to the motor and semantic resonance in both the optimization of their processes, and reactivity and sensitivity to environmental stimuli, across a range of tasks:
(i) in grounded language understanding (cf. e.g. 22 , including prediction of the next sensory feedback, (vi) to support action execution (with linguistic input making the actor better aware of the affordances, i.e. physically feasible action possibilities), and (vii) to reinforce feedback in 'soft robotics' and morphological computation, where there is no clear separation between the controller (or orchestrator) and the hardware (morphology), and the tasks are distributed between the brain, body, and environment (cf. e.g. Paul 19 The limitations need not in themselves necessarily be a bad thing; to the contrary, they may serve a useful role in limiting the search space and focusing attention on the most vital stimuli. The restrictions imposed on the vocal apparatus in turn mean that speech is segmented and decelerated enough to facilitate comprehension. The relative absence of such constraints on computers may be the exact reason why the latter have problems tackling tasks where humans perform with ease (Tom Froese, p.c., 9 Mar 2012). 20 Just as robots can have an advantage when equipped with e.g. infrared, or ultrasonic sensors. 21 Sensorimotor dynamics plays a crucial part in toddlers' learning to categorise objects: it is only when the infant brings the object in front of their eyes and focuses on it that s/he learns to associate it with its name (Smith 2010). 22 Though originally grounded in sensorimotor experience, mental imagery, or simulation of interaction with the world, may subsequently become environmentally decoupled, as in forward models (Clark & Grush 1999 Goertzel et al. 2008) . Given the role played by the morphology of the sensory apparatus and the architecture of the sensorimotor loop in shaping and structuring the information that reaches the controller, and thereby in concept formation, it would anyway be difficult for a machine to form the same concepts, categories and behaviours as us without having comparable morphology (as remarked e.g. by Barsalou 1999 or Lakoff & Johnson 1998 ). However, if our goal is to have machines 'thinking' and behaving in a way compatible with ours-which is a highly practical and desirable goal-then it is of high importance for them to develop, learn and function in a similar "experience space" (Taivo Lints, p.c.; cf. also Wang 2009:5) .
The requirement that the behaviour, perception and conceptual apparatus of artificial intelligent agents be grounded in their experience of their own interaction with the outside world at once means that their concepts and categories need not necessarily rely on the same minimal constituents and grammatical categories as have been externally identified and defined in linguistics. Instead, the gradually emergent categories are more likely to be intrinsically meaningful behaviours and affordances (see also Kuniyoshi et al. 2004 ), action-oriented rather than orbocentric (Hoffmann & Pfeifer 2011 ). For instance, to a robot who has never kicked or observed anyone kick anything but footballs, the minimal unit of meaning may be <kick a ball> rather than <kick> alone (although this does not rule out the possibility of extrapolation and abstraction should a relevant opportunity arise). 24 Similarly, irrespective of whether the input is expressed using [ NP kicking a ball] or [ VP kick a ball], it should activate the same action schema. 23 The idea of morphological computation in animals can be well illustrated on the example of cockroaches skilfully climbing over obstacles that exceed their body height, using relatively few neurons, offloading most tasks to morphology (by reconfiguring the mesothoracic shoulder joint), exploiting mechanical change and feedback, and capitalising on the stability of the local feedback circuits; cf. In order to form a meaningful experience and construct coherent, reliable and robust representations of the surrounding world, the human brain combines prior knowledge with sensory input arriving from various modalities and integrates these at multiple levels of the neuraxis. This serves to maximize the efficiency of everyday performance and learning, enhancing the salience of the events, helping increase the detection and identification of the external stimuli, disambiguate them, compensate for incomplete information, and shorten reaction times. In view of the inseparability of language and the body, the concept of multisensory integration-whether in natural or artificial cognitive agents-should be extended and cover both the linguistic input and the complementary information that the brain combines from temporally coincident sensory impressions. This does not mean that we should 'dumb down' the statistical processes where they operate successfully; instead, where the input stream in one channel is too noisy, turning on auxiliary channels 25 and interacting with the environment in an active manner may generate ancillary data and help e.g. disambiguate the signal and take the right decision (see also Pfeifer & Scheier 1997; Beer 2003) . 26 An added benefit would then be significantly reduced programming costs.
TOWARDS A BROADER DEFINITION OF MULTISENSORY INTEGRATION
CONCLUSIONS
A living organism enacts the world it lives in; its effective embodied action in the world actually constitutes its perception
and thereby grounds its cognition. I have started out with a brief depiction of the dualistic Cartesian approach that has characterised much of twentieth-century thought, including that underlying most of traditional AI. While adherence to such an outlook has in many domains led to very spectacular achievements, there are limits which purely symbolic systems cannot overcome. While the subject of the mind-body relationship is by no means new, the link, still very often ignored by cognitive science communities (logic, linguistics, computer science) may be the key element for bypassing the present limitations of AI systems.
Language, too, has for a long time been treated across scientific domains as an abstract system operating largely independently from the body (articulatory-perceptual organs notwithstanding). I have presented an inventory of heterogeneous evidence against such a view, addressing instead the issue of the link between language and body. While many of the embodied language phenomena specific to humans have little 25 These channels need not all be active at all times, especially when it might burden the cognitive load in non-essential tasks, when conflicting inputs can bring the machine to a halt, or when the benefits-e.g. in terms of speed-would be negligible (Richard Littauer, p.c., 26 May 2012). The system's available resources should be dynamically allocated to different tasks in such a way as to achieve the highest overall efficiency. 26 One consequence for humans may be that the role of kinaesthetic modality, traditionally largely believed to dominate in children, but be negligible in adults (cf. e.g. Barbe & Milone 1981; Felder & Spurlin 2005) , should be reassessed, as the effectiveness may be demonstrated of 'learning-by-doing' and task-based approaches to language learning and teaching where the students have to use their bodies (e.g. when acquiring novel lexis via common cookery classes). direct translation to machines, there are others that can profitably be exploited and inspire the development of robust artificial autonomous agents that rely on semantics grounded in their past experience (both linguistic and non-verbal) as well as possible related operations on the concepts concerned. Agents which are adaptive to feedback and can, despite insufficient knowledge, time pressure and storage space constraints safely and successfully navigate, learn, and communicate in the complex and dynamic ecological niche they share with human actors.
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